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The recent announcement by the Secretary of Defense of single manager
assignments in the supply and services field aroused curiosity with reference
to previous efforts and results, and the background and potential of the single
manager concept. This paper of inquiry resulted from that curiosity and has as
its purpose the development of and answers to the following questions concerning
single manager assignments: Historical development of specific efforts to
accomplish unified logistic patterns, "What is the single manager plan? What
does it encompass? And what will it accomplish?
The information contained in this paper was largely obtained in conver-
sation with or from references provided by representatives of the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics), the Office of Naval
Material, and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. The cooperation of repre-
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By any yardstick the Department of Defense is the largest industry in
the United States • Its expenditures consume between one-eighth and one-tenth
of our national income. The Department employs more than k,000,000 people,
which is more than twice the manpower of the ten largest corporations of the
nation, and. which comprises 7% of the total national labor force, including
military personnel. The assets, real and personal, approximate ihO billions of
dollars. The activities of the Department of Defense are spread throughout the
U8 states, in over 16,000 cities, and to ?2 foreign countries.1 The Navy alone
is approximately £ times the size of the 8 largest corporations in the United
States, and carries in its supply system about 13 times the numbers of individ-
ual items of supply as the largest common type catalog issued by Sears HoebucI:
and Company.
By any standard of comparison, it is readily apparent that the Depart-
ment of Defense or any one of its principal components (Army, Navy, or Air
Force) is really big business, consumes a sizeable percent of the gross national
economy, and by the very nature and size of its operations constitutes a fertile
area for improper coordination and the occurrence of waste*
Prior to and during World War II, varying degrees of coordination were
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
Business Organization of the Department of Defense (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1955), p. k.
'

2achieved in the purchase of certain specific items; such as, lumber, subsistence*
medical supply items, chemical warfare equipment, small arms, and small arms
ammunition. To preserve and extend the benefits of wartime coordination,
Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson in 19U5 sponsored a joint review which
provided the groundwork for many subsequent developments in the coordination of
purchasing. However, the need for even more complete coordination throughout
the whole field of supply—including storage, distribution, transportation, etc,
was recognized. The joint review report commented: "We believe that closer
coordination in these areas would be found entirely possible and highly
desirable, "2
Unification and Its Implications
As World War II came to an end, many responsible officials in Congress
and in executive departments saw the need for more coordination in all of the
operations of the Armed Services, The views of these officials were reflected
in a concerted movement to achieve economy and coordination by statute. The
culmination of this movement was the National Security Act of 19k7> which estab-
lished the Department of Defense to provide policy direction, authority, and
control of the military departments and agencies. The Act specifically pro-
vided:
Three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army,
the Navy (including Naval Aviation and the U. S, Marine Corps), and the Air
Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for
their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian con-
trol but not to merge them...and (Sec. 202a(3)) take appropriate steps to
eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procure-
ment, supply, transportation, storage, health and research...
3
With the passage of the Unification Act, many unification partisans,
2Ibid
., p, 36,
^U.S, Congress, National Security Act, l?ii7j P, L, 2k3, 80th Congress
(Washington: Government Printing Office, ±9ku 9 p. 3»

3particularly congressional, thought that the statute provided the solutions to
all problems of coordination, duplication, and waste. However, the Department
of Defense was and is a monstrous organization, and the wheels of progress turn
slowly. Over the years (immediately prior to and after the passage of the Uni-
fication Act) some of the ablest leaders and administrators have attempted to
organize and manage the national defense along the same successful and economical
lines that the nation is accustomed to in business and industry with varying
degrees of success. The mandate in Section 202(a)(3) of the National Security
Act *to take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplications..." is
within itself highly discretionary and subject to much interpretation. Undpubt-
i
edly, the slowness of sweeping changes to appear in the supply, purchase, and
related fields can be traced to the philosophy of decentralized operations
practiced in industry, familiar to the civilian administrators of the Department
of Defense, as well as the operating and readiness considerations inherent in
the far flung Defense Department, and the "resistance to change" normally
encountered when vested interests are disturbed.
In any event, the 1°5>£ Hoover Commission Report laments:
Since the passage of the National Security Act in 19U7, efforts have been
made to find ways to achieve coordination under the existing organization
without an acceptable degree of success.. »h
The Department of Defense indicated the complexity of the coordination
problem in the supply and services field in a Itebruary 1956 press release, nich
stated in part:
One of the most perplexing problems besetting the Department of Defense,
since its inception, has been the development of a suitable system for the
distribution and management of common-use commercial type of items to the
four military services. The objective, in this system development process,
was to reduce inventories and eliminate the overlapping or duplication of
functions within the Department of Defense Supply System, and at the same




time positively assure that military readiness and the ability to retaliate
within the fighting forces was not jeopardized, For nearly a decade, the
DOD has reached for a solution to this problem, ..5
The Approach Pattern for Subsequent Chapters
In the preceding pages, the general background and need for coordination
in tiie supply and services field in the Departraent of Defense lias been estab-
lished; the "mandatory" and "discretionary" provisions of the National Security
Act of 19h79 as applied to the supply and services areas of coordination have
been discussedj and some comments by reputable agencies or administrators on
progress or lack of progress have been presented,
The subsequent chapters will trace congressional and defense departraent
actions, legislative and administrative, in attempts to achieve the proper
coordination in the supply and services fields. Particular emphairis will be
devoted to the Single lianager As^ t "Ian recently announced by the Secretary
of Defense,
^Departaent of Defense rross iielease, "rtew Department OJE Defense Unified




ATTITUDES AM) ACTIONS OF CONGRESS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General
The Department of Defense as established by the National Security Act of
19U7 was little more than a federation of three independent agencies under a
Secretary who possessed relatively few powers and an inadequate staff. The
Secretary of each Armed Service was declared to possess all powers, authority,
and controls not specifically given to the Secretary of Defense by the 19k7
National Security Act, and as the head of an executive department had, theoreti-
cally at least, full legal access for reporting to and consulting with the Chief
Executive.
The Forrestal Diaries portray very vividly the struggles and tribula-
tions of the first Secretary of Defense in attempting to achieve a unified
budget presentation when faced with a total dollar ceiling imposed by the Chief
Executive and the seeming inflexible recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. As Mr. Robert Lovett once remarked:
...The systems in departments differ in many respects, and they have grown
up over the long period of years—in the case of the Army over a century.
The organization of the three departments differ. Their controls differ.
The only thing in which I think they are similar is in the perhaps under-
standable reluctance to give up the known for the unknown, • #6
It is little wonder, therefore, that progress at coordination was slow in
becoming reality.
Act of 19U7
"U.S., Congress, Senate, Implementation of Title IV, national Security
kl as amended (Washington! Government Printing Office, 19bh), p. 11*

6MATS and KSTS
The first visible efforts at elimination of duplications and overlapping
was in the service field of transportation* During World War II, the Navy, in
addition to the Air Force (Army Air Corps), had developed intricate and exten-
sive air transportation facilities and route networks to provide logistic
support to the operating forces. Many of the long overseas routes were parallel*
It became evident very early after passage of the Unification Act that this was
an area destined for close review and certain change, irrespective of the
efficiency records depicted by the statisticians and the chart room talent.
Accordingly, on 1 July I9I4.8, the Naval Air Transport Service was disestablished,
and the Navy transport squadrons that operated over parallel routes with those
of the Air Force were merged with the Air Transport Command of the Air Force to
form the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). MATS operates as a major
command of the Air Force, utilizing Navy personnel and equipment in the ratios
determined at that time, 19kQ* The Navy continued to fund for the material and
personnel requirements necessary to support its determined contribution to the
joint venture* While coordination was achieved it is undoubtedly still open to
debate, particularly in the eyes of the Navy, as to whether significant economies
have resulted, for the Navy was allowed to continue its short haul operations,
iand its efficiently operated organization was diffused with the more elaborate
organization of the Air Force or retained and spread over the more restricted
functions of fleet service.
Just as the Air Force and Navy had developed duplicating air transporta-
tion routes and facilities, the Army, in addition to the Navy, had acquired its
own fleet of surface transportation and supporting port facilities. The Army's
fleet was composed of chartered and civil service manned government owned

7vessels, while the Navy's transport fleet was largely government owned and
manned by service personnel. In October 19U9 the Military Sea Transportation
Service (MSTS) was established under Navy operation and direction. During the
following year, the functions of ocean going transportation performed by the
ft.rmy were phased into the MSTS organization. The operations of MSTS were placed
under the industrial fund in July l°5l« Each service is billed for services
rendered at rates to insure a breakeven operation. The testimony of Department
of Defense officials before Congressional Committees indicates that tremendous
economies have been achieved by the MSTS operation, with special emphasis to
the Navy Industrial Fund procedures employed. This was corroborated by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Mr. W.J. McNeil, in a speech
before the Navy Comptroller Class at George Washington University in January
L956.
19U9 Hoover Commission Report and Recommendations
The ink was little more than dry on the 19hl National Security Act
aefore the beginning of the first Hoover Commission studies on Organization of
bhe Executive Branch of the Government. These studies were akin to those that
night have been conducted by a reputable consulting engineer firm. The various
bask force members that performed the spade work represented some of the best
talent available in the professional fields studied and were picked from
Lndustry, government, and the professions. Certain comments by the 19U9 Hoover
Commission Report in the field of supply and logistics are considered pertinent,
of which the following extracts are regarded as especially applicable to this
Inquiry:
7
'P.K. Sherman, Economical Financial Operations in Government; The MSTS
Jnder the Industrial Fund-Type of Operation (Unpublished MBA Thesis, George
Washington University, January 195U)> pt 5»

8Supply is not fully recognized as an important executive function* At a
time when personnel and budgeting have achieved status as vital staff
functions, there has been a continued failure to appreciate fully the rela-
tionship of supply to government efficiency. There is no comprehensive
government-wide system that gives adequate emphasis to the many phases of
supply. ...A maze of laws and regulations surrounds the whole process with
unnecessary red tape. The emphasis of the laws is not on promoting effi-
ciency and economy but upon preventing fraud, Overregulation encourages
routine buying and prevents economy and the exercise of initiative. Pur-
chasing is consumed in red tape. It is estimated that on over half of the
3,000,000 purchase orders issued by civilian agencies, the cost of the paper
work exceeded the cost of the items,"
The Commission^ recommendations with respect to the field of supply
were directed at both the civilian agencies and the Department of Defense, The
more important of these recommendations were*
#3. Establish a Supply Policy Committee composed of representatives of the
Bureau of Federal Supply and the National Military Establishment to coor-
dinate civilian aad military supply operations.
$U Establish a Bureau of Federal Supply in the Office of General Services
with competent personnel and clothed with adequate authority to provide the
leadership necessary to achieve in the executive branch an efficient supply
organization which would also coordinate with the National Military Estab-
lishment. ...
#11, Strengthen the Authority of the Secretary of Defense so that he may
provide the leadership necessary for improving the supply operations of the
National Military Establishment. This charter (Munitions Board) should be
expanded, however, to cover all phases of military supply including pur-
chasing, storage and issue, traffic management, specification, inspection,
property identification, and property utilization...
#12. It is specifically re commended that the national Security Act of 19hl
be amended so as to strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense in
order that he may integrate the organization and procedures of the various
phases of supply in the constituent departments of the National Military
Establishment,
9
19k9 Amendments to the Unification Act
Undoubtedly, the most important and provocative recommendation listed
above was that concerning amending the National Security Act of 19k7 to
strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense "in order that he may
integrate the organization and procedures of the various phases of supply,.."
"Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
op. cit., pp. 96-97.
9lbid., p. 101*.

This •authority 1 had been the basis of much debate prior to the passage of the
Unification Act, because various partisans feared the •power' that one man would
possess over so vast a territory as covered by the primary components of the
Department of Defense. Even Mr. Forre3tal, the original advocate of limited
authority and control for the Secretary of Defense, changed his views when he
faced up to the realities of providing results demanded of unification by the
President of the united States, the Congress, and other interested persons and
groups.
Congress, in response to the Hoover Commission recommendations, took
action in 19h9 to strengthen the original Unification Act. Public Law 216,
8lst Congress, strengthened and clarified in some respects the authority of the
Secretary of Defense, but omitted any new measures for a unified supply organi-
zation. The specific language contained in Section 202(a)(3) of the 1°U7 Unifi-
cation Act authorizing the Secretary of Defense to take steps to eliminate
unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply,
transportation, storage, health, and research was omitted in the 1914-9 Amendments
as it was argued such language was unnecessary in ihe light of the broadened
authority proposed to be conferred generally on the Secretary of Defense. After
the 19U9 Amendments, the law merely presumed, without specifically stating, that
the Secretary would take steps to eliminate unnecessary overlapping and duplica-
tion. The 19U9 Amendments further clarified the role of the Munitions Board
and its Chairman by establishing trie Board more precisely as a staff arm of the
Secretary of Defense. Some congressional elements, Bonner Overseas Report
#199U> 82d Congress, 2d Session, have called the 19^9 legislation compromising
as indicated in the following commentst
• . .Nevertheless, the 19h9 legislation again compromised between opposing
concepts of proper organization in the military establishment. What was
taken away with one hand was given back with the other. Although the
departmental secretaries were deprived of cabinet rank, the separate status
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of the departments was not only reaffirmed but reinforced in several parti-
culars. As if to remove any doubts on the score, the amendments added to
the declaration of policy of the original act the intent of congress to
provide three military departments, separately administered,-*^
The National Security Act of 19hl was further amended on 2 April 19h9
(P, L. 36, 8lst Congress) by establishing the post of Under Secretary of Defense
to assist the Secretary and "act for, and exercise the powers of the Secretary
of Defense during his absence..."
From a legislative point of view, 19U9 was a busy year with respect to
statutes affecting the Department of Defense, The Federal Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act was passed and approved on 30 June 19h9» This Act provided
that the Administrator of General Services establish and maintain such uniform
Federal supply catalog systems to identify and classify personal property under
the control of all Federal agencies. This act further provided that the
Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of General Services coordinate tiie
catalog activities of the two agencies in order to avoid unnecessary duplica-
tion. Under this authority coordinating committees were established and areas
of understanding ; were agreed to by the Secretary of Defense and the Administra-
tor of General Services, Subsequently the Department of Defense attempted to
withdraw from this arrangement, A resolution drafted and approved by the DOD,
proposing to separate its cataloging program from all other departments and
agencies of the Government, was rejected by the Congress, Thereafter, House
Concurrent Resolution 97 was adopted, and placed the Congress on record as
again approving the previously authorized developments of a single supply catalog
system, and calling upon the affected agencies to expedite action on the program.
The entire program was reappraised by the 82d Congress, Under the authority of
Public Law U36, 82d Congress, a Defense Supply Management Agency was established
10T, B, Curtiss, Member of Congress, Letter to Honorable C, E. Wilson,
Secretary of Defense (Washington, D, C,» January 1955).
• *
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within the Department of Defense and authorized to develop "a single catalog
system and related supply standardization program* '"•*
Congressional Hearings and the Q'Mahoney Amendment
As will be indicated in the next chapter much time consuiuifiing effort
and many specific actions were taken in the Defense Department with respect to
logistic coordination during the years 19U7 to 1955• However, such actions were
not sufficiently rapid or inclusive to satisfy many serious minded proponents of
unification. Beginning in 1°5>0, several committees of the House of Bepresenta-
tives began investigations designed to spotlight alleged weaknesses or undue
slowness in effecting an integrated supply system throughout the Departeient of
Defense. The general tenor of these hearings seemed to be based on an assump-
tion that the statutes intended a sort of fourth service of supply rather than
the separately administered armed services, each embracing its own service and
support elements.
In the spring of 195l> the Intergovernment Relations Subcoraiittee of the
House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, following up a
subcommittee study of 19i?0, initiated a survey of the management of Federal
supply with special emphasis on military supply management. After extensive
hearings and field studies, the subcommittee issued several reports pointing out
deficiencies in the management and operation of the supply and distribution
systems. The Bonner Committee (House) in its report of June 27> 1°£L stated
H
•••unification from the standpoint of military supply, rests largely on paper,"
The information contained in the above reports, together with other data and
observation of the committee members, was made available to the Appropriations
^-U.S,, Congress, Senate, Senate Action on Hoover Commission Beports,
Beport of the Committee on Government Operations, (V.ashington* (iovernment
Printing Office, 1552), p. U5.
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Committees of Congress. Based on this information, the O^ahoney Amendment to
the 1953 DGD Appropriations Act was passed as permanent legislation. This
ndment had as its purpose the achievement of an efficient, economical and
practical operation of an integrated supply system to meet the needs of the
military departments without duplicating or overlapping of operations or func-
tions. The Act prohibited any officer of the Department of Defense from obli-
gating funds until the Secretary of Defense issued necessary regulations to
achieve the purpose indicated above
,
The Q'Mahoney Amendment was a compromise inasmuch as Representative
Bonner introduced a bill, H, R, 8130, on 9 June 1952 to provide for complete
integration of supply and services activities. This bill received considerable
Senate support. However, as the matter had not been considered by the Armed
Services Committees, the O'Hahoney Amendment was tacked on the appropriations
act and became permanent legislation under which the Department of Defense still
operates.
fieorganization Plan Number Six
In the 1952 presidential campaign, candidate Eisenhower proclaimed, with
reference to the Department of Defense, that ",,,Such unity as we have achieved
is too much in form and too little in substance,. , tt Further, he promised that
the new administration would create a commission of the nation 1 s most capable
civilians to restudy the operations of the Department of Defense, The Rocke-
feller Commission was appointed for the above expressed purpose in early 1953,
and based upon its findings and recommendations, Reorganization Plan No, 6 was
submitted to Congress in 1953* and was subsequently approved as the law of the
land.
The main provisions of Reorganization Plan Number Six relating to the
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supply and logistic operations of the Department of Defense are included in the
following testimony of the Deputy Secretary of Defense before the Committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives, 83d Congress
s
• ••The Plan calls for abolition of the Munitions Board, the R, & D, Board,
the Defense Supply Management Agency, and the Office of Director of Installa
tions and vests their functions in the Secretary of Defense. At the same
time, the Plan authorized the appointment of new assistant secretaries of
Defense to whom the Secretary of Defense intends to assign the duties now
vested in the agencies to be abolished and certain other functions now
assigned to other officials, ••the reorganization plan provides for six
additional assistant secretaries,..-^
•.As to the Munitions Board, we have found the Board system and the
committee structure -which has resulted therefrom to be too cumbersome ••••
to satisfactorily manage the supply and logistic responsibilities of the
Department of Defense ....We expect him (Asst. SecDef S & L) to work in areas
of production planning, production, procurement, distribution, and traffic
and transportation.
Concurrently, we propose to delegate back to the services those operational
matters which have become the duty of the Munitions Board over the past few
years and we hope thereby to convert this unit into a leadership group which
will recommend policy and see that it is carried out in important matters of
supply and logistics....The Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics wiH
be assigned the responsibility of recommending modernization of the entire
system of supply,,,13
12u«S., Congress, House, Reorganization Plan No, 6, Hearing Before
Committee on Government Operations, ijJ3d Congress ^Washington*





SPECIFIC ACTIONS AND PROGRAMS IN DEFENSE
In the previous chapter, the legislative acts passed to achieve better
coordination in the Defense Department -with respect to the supply and services
fields have been highlighted. It is the purpose of this chapter to delve into
specific actions taken by the Defense Department*
General and Policy
The area of supply and services was and is a most logical point of
attack in the problem of coordination, elimination of duplication, and over-
lapping, etc* Small measures of coordination existed between the services at
the time of unification in \9klt primarily in the area of single service pur-
chase* As will be enumerated hereafter, the Munitions ^oard became the spark-
plug and arm of the Secretary of Defense in his efforts to coordinate the
three services* This coordination reflected itself in the areas of uniform
cataloging, single service purchase assignments, joint purchasing assignments,
and cross-servicing*
19k9 Policy Memorandum and 1951 Restatement
A Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 17 November 19U9 established
basic policy for the development of the Department of Defense Supply System and
assigned responsibility to the Munitions Board for developing the system. This
memorandum was amplified and clarified by a SecDef Memorandum dated 17 July




reflects the enunciated policy of the Secretary of Defense concerning the
Department of Defense Supply System!
...the basic policies of the DOD which shall govern the development and
operation of the supply systems of the 3 military departments are:
a). Each of the military departments shall operate and maintain a supply
system and shall be responsible for the supply support of its own forces,
except when such support is otherwise provided by specific agreements or
assignments at force, theater, military department or DOD level,
b). The supply systems developed shall be such that the combat efficiency of
the armed services as a whole is the most effective which can be obtained
within the limits of available personnel, funds, materiel, and legislative
authority, and the procedures and methods of operation for the system of
supply practicable for war will govern techniques used in time of peace,
c). Uniform policies, standards, and procedures shall be developed to the
extent necessary and feasible to effectively coordinate military-supply
operations in order to maintain or increase effective support of military
operations and prevent unnecessary duplication or overlapping among the
services, and to insure the maximum conservation and utilization of materiel
and manpower resources.
d). Cross, joint or common servicing... shall be effected whenever such action
will result in maintaining or increasing the effectiveness of support of
military operations and will also eliminate unnecessary overlapping and
duplication among the services.
e). Single procurement in the form of single department, joint agency, or
plant cognizance shall be effected whenever such actions will effectively
support... and will result in the elimination of unnecessary overlapping and
duplication of manpower, facilities, and operations in the procurement field,
...To the extent feasible and not already accomplished within each military
department responsibility for procurement and distribution of common classes
of supply, including technical items shall be assigned to a single (but not
necessarily the same) technical service, bureau, or command.
Priority study shall be given to the feasibility of assigning to a single
military department the responsibility for procurement, distribution, in-
cluding depot storage and issue for classes of common items of supply and
equipment, and depot maintenance of such equipment. Medical supply items
shall be the first category to be studied.
...The Munitions Board shall have primary responsibility for initiating,
coordinating, interpreting and establishing priority for all actions re-
quired by or in collaboration with the military departments to implement
the basic policies set forth above....Ik
While setting forth certain definite areas of coordination, it is signi-
ficant to note that the policy directive emphasizes that each military department
^Department of Defense, "Basic Policies Governing the Department of
Defense Supply System, » 17 July 19$1.
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will operate and maintain its own supply system. For the first time, the single
nanager assignment plan, the 19>6 Defense Department Policy, is recognized,
although $ years were required for its fruition as will be indicated in chapter
EV.
1952 Policy Directive and Congressional Reaction
As previously indicated in chapter II, the !Mahoney Amendment, Section
638 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1953 , required positive
action by the Secretary of Defense to integrate supply and services activities
among the three services. Department of Defense Directive Number UOOO.8 dated
17 November 19^2 contained the Basic Regulations for the Military Supply System
and covered the areas of procurement, commercial and industrial-type facilities,
distribution system, cataloging and standardization, conservation, utilization
and disposal, transportation and traffic management, production, personnel and
training, requirements review, and supply system expansion. This directive
constituted initial compliance with the provisions of the C^Mahoney Amendment.
Few new areas were coveredj however, it constituted the first comprehensive
statement of policy issued in a formal directive manner. The more important
elements of the policy directive referred to are quoted for emphasis:
..Within each military service there shall be established and maintained
but one single supply and inventory control point for each specified cate-
gory of items...Integrated supply support for common-use standard stock
items will be developed. In areas within the United States and overseas,
supply support will be accomplished by single service assignment in which
one department will support all others... 1?
Within six months after the passage of the O'Mahoney Amendment and pro-
mulgation of the above referenced DOD directive, the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations was holding hearings on Military Supply Management, and in July
^Department of Defense, "Basic Regulations for the Military Supply




...that progress in the improvement of the military management is distin-
guished by an inordinate slowness. ...It has heard the promises that before
another year passes, things -will be under control. The printed hearings
of congressional investigations are fraught -with testimony of this kind.
This has been equally true of testimony before the Bonner subcommittee...
The one constant in this great amount of activity is the uniformed forces,
each dedicated to the preservation of its own systems and procedures....
A
blind loyalty to the "separately administered" theory as applied to the
business phases of military operations, however, can be costly and waste-
ful....^
1953 Policy Guidance by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Supply & Logistics)
Later in 1953* the Assistant Secretary of Defense (supply and Logistics) t
in furnishing policy guidance to an AdHoc Committee on Supply Systems for
common-use items, stated:
The experience of the military departments indicates that in order to reduce
supply problems to manageable proportion, emphasis at this time would be
more advantageously directed toward greater efficiency within individual
departmental supply systems and supply management functions... effective and
economical cross-servicing... and the closest practicable coordination of
the departmental supply systems... .Future supply studies will not be con-
fined to a review and analysis of a category of materiel, but will be
directed toward the accomplishment of the foregoing principles on the basis
of placing first things first...
•
There is no present, or intended, or desired, plan for the establishment by
direction or indirection of a Fourth Department of Supply or to divide
commodity segments among departments. '
The policy guidance letter further indicates the areas of analysis and improve-
ments for the supply systems to embrace: financing and accounting procedures
necessary for cross-servicing, reductions in inventory volumes and transporta-
tion costs, spelled-out inter-service and cross-servicing agreements with parti-
cular attention directed to responsiveness of supply systems to command.
•*-"U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Military
Supply Management, Union Calendar No. 291, Report 857, 83d Congress (Washington:
uovemment Printing Office, July 1953), p. 3.
^Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply & Logistics) letter, subject:
Policy Guidance for AdHoc Committee on Supply Systems for Common-use Items,
dated 13 November 1953.
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The above policy guidelines seem to support the objectives contained in
the policy directive number UOOO.3 previously xeferencedj at the same time
emphasis is given to improving the existing supply systems and supply nanageaent
procedures and techniques of the three services. This approach is, of course,
the same type of action condemned by the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions in July 19f?3, xjreviou&ly quoted in this chapter. This approach seemed to
have prevailed well into 15>££, at which tiiae the Hoove: ieoion Uepoorto
influenced serious consideration of a fourth service of su;.ply or various
alternatives which will be examined more fully in chapter IV,
It is considered proper to now consider some of tlie various detailed
procedures and devices utilised to achieve coordination of supply and service
activities within the framework of the above referenced policy directives.
These efforts were divided into the following catogories: uniform cataloging,
single service purchase assignments, joint a-ency purchase, and cross-servicing.
Uniform Cataloging
Historically* the lack of adequate identification and cataloging of
supply items has bem a weak link in the chain of procurement, warehousing,
distribution, and issue of supplies and materials. Adequate identification can
provide the common language tools which aid in the elimination of duplicating
items in supply systems, facilitate cross-servicing, establish interchange-
ability between items, and facilitate inventory control and distribution.
World War II procurement programs and supply problems revealed the inadequacy
cf the then existing stock catalogs, Immediately thereafter each of the mili-
tary services developed its own system of controlling its stock identification
and purchase.
In !ShS$ the President recognised the economic waste of uncoordinated
procurement of goods and e<rxi.pneiit Tor government, iie instructed the bureau of
~4
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the Budget to develop a standard Federal catalog far use by all government
agencies. For the next $ years the operating responsibility for this assign-
ment was shifted from one agency to another. Funds allocated to finance the
project were inadequate.
In V)kl the Army-Navy Munitions Board established the Army-Navy Muni-
tions Board Cataloging Agency with the following functions, among others t to
ascertain the areas in which joint Army-Navy cataloging operations were practi-
cable 5 and to coordinate Army-Navy cataloging operations with the Federal Cata-
loging System. This effort was continued after the Unification let, and its
program was established for accomplishment within four years—target completion
date June 30, 19$2* The magnitude of such a program can be more realistically
appreciated when it is estimated that as many as 5*000,000 items had to be
uniformly identified, weeded out, and catalogued. The objective of the program
was aptly described in a Memorandum of Secretary Forrestal under date of May 12,
L9U8i
The ultimate objective will be to name, describe, classify, and number each
unique item used, purchased, stocked, or distributed by the Military Estab-
lishment, by such methods and in such manner that only one distinct selec-
tion of letters and numerals will identify the same item within a bureau or
service, or between bureaus or services or between the departments. The
single item characterization will then be used for all functions of supply
from original purchase to final field or area distribution. .. .each supply
system of the services will select for its own purposes, and publish..., but
individual items will bear the same characterization in every catalog seg-
ment thus prepared and used*-'-?
Beginning in 19U8* the Munitions Board Cataloging Agency had representa-
tion of the Bureau of Federal Supply and other civil agencies. Recognizing the
importance of the cataloging program, the 191*9 Hoover Commission recommended a
ieclaration of congressional policy to insure participation and cooperation of
the military and civil agencies. Pursuant to this recommendation, Public Law l£2
^•"A. P. Bolieau, "A Comptroller 1 s Appraisal of the Federal Cataloging






was passed on July 1, 19k9 setting up the General Services Administration and
authorizing the Administrator to ^establish and maintain such uniform Federal
supply catalog system...* provided, that the Administrator and the Secretary of
Defense shall coordinate the cataloging activities of the GSA and the National
Military Establishment so as to avoid unnecessary duplication. "20
The necessity for expediting the development of a single catalog was
emphasized with the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 97 which stated in
part: "...that the development of a single supply catalog system for all
agencies of the Federal Government, both civilian and military, is of vital
necessity to the national security and the civilian economy.. ."^ In accordance
with the obligations imposed by P. L. 152 and House Concurrent Besolution 97>
the Munitions Board Cataloging Agency and the Federal Supply Service of the GSA
concurred in an area of agreement in which the GSA delegated to the Secretary of
Defense full authority to develop a Federal Catalog System suitable for inter-
departmental supply activities and government-industry relationships. Thus,
after nearly 6 years of organizational effort and growing pains, an agreement
was reached between the military, that had an B$% inters st in the program, and
the civil agency delegated the responsibility by law for the program.
Public Law k32
any realists would surmise, the four-year target date (195>2) for com-
pletion of the cataloging program was not roalized. Congress was, of course,
dissatisfied with the progress, and passed in July 1952 the Defense Cataloging
and Standardization Act, P. L. 432 "to provide for an economical, efficient, and
effective supply isanagement organization within the Department of Defense throu^.
the establishment of a single supply cataloging system, the standardization of
SOlbid., p. 19. B-Ibii., p. 20.
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supplies and the more efficient use of supply testing, inspection, packaging,
and acceptance facilities and service," The act gave impetus and formalized by
statute the program then in existence in Defense, made the Secretary of Defense
solely responsible for the cataloging and standardization program in Defense
subject to the proviso of coordination with the GSA to avoid unnecessary dupli-
cation, and directed the transmission to Congress of two progress reports
22
annually on each of the cataloging and standardization programs.
Accomplishments and Outlook
Pursuant to Department of Defense Reorganization Plan Number Six, the
Agency created by Public Law U32 was abolished, and the Standardization and
Cataloging Programs became a specific responsibility of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Supply and Logistics), Progress in the standardization and cata-
loging programs is indicated in the following testimony of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Supply and Logistics) before the House Subcommittee on Appro-
priations which was considering the Department of Defense Appropriations for
1956:
...As of December 31, 19514, a total of 1,230,000 items had been identified
in the Federal catalog system. This is approximately $$% of the present
estimated total of 2,250,000 items in the supply system.
...Since the establishment of the schedule (identification by commodity
area) in April 195U, approximately 60,000 items per month have been
identified, and there is every expectation that all identification work will
be completed as scheduled by September 1956.
...Although 180,000 items have already been eliminated from supply systems
through standardization, the surface has hardly been scratched. . .*3
Further evidence of progress is contained in testimony of Department of Defense
officials given in 1955 before the House Committee on Government Operations.
op
"U.S., Congress, "Defense Cataloging and Standardization Act, Public
Law U36 - 82d Congress," 1 July 1952 ("tfashington: Government Printing Office,
July 1952).
^U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1955), pp. U36, 107.

This testimony contained an expectation that the military services will replace
its own separate catalogs with the Federal catalog by the end of 1Q£8
•
The use of a Federal catalog is contingent upon all items in the supply
systems having been identified, cross-referenced, retagged, restored in many
cases, and all supply management records converted to the new system. The
amount of detail and effort involved is difficult to comprehend: but, even to
the unacquainted, it is apparent that a tremendous job will have been accomp-
lished. Even the 19$$ Hoover Commission Reports contain a few words of praises
The Commission commends the Department of Defense and the GSA for their
current efforts in carrying forward the work of establishing the Federal
Catalog System, We agree with the task force that the catalog program must
be closely supervised by the Secretary of Defense to assure its completion
and effective use at an early date, 24
Single Service or Joint Procurement Assignments
General
Even before the Unification Act of 191+7* there had been some areas of
agreement on single service procurements i.e. canned foods and bulk lumber , The
procurement assignment area was therefore the most logical point of attack to
which the Munitions Board gave attention following the passage of the 19k7
Unification Act. The single procurement assignments were made according to one
of the following designations of responsibility:
1, Procurement within the Department of Defense;
a. Single department procurement whereby one department procures
supplies to satisfy the requirements of all the military departments,
b. Plant cognizance procurement, whereby one department procures items
from a particular plant to satisfy the requirements of all tlie
military departments. This type of single procurement is limited to
airframes, aircraft engines, and propellers,
c. Joint procurement, whereby a jointly staffed and financed activity
procures supplies to satisfy the requirements of all mi 1 i tary
departments.
2Utt s.^U.S,, Congress, rlouse Document No* I4I, ^ ^^ort on Use and, disposal
of Federal Surplus Property, Pursuant to P, L, 108, 03d Congress {.Washington*




Under this arrangement the General Services Administration has been
designated by DOD-GSA agreements to purchase certain specified common
use items for all three military departments.
Over the years procurement assignments have been made for several hun-
dred items in 45 commodity areas. The latest revision (1955) deleted certain
obvious items; i.e. aircraft carriers, etc, which served no useful purpose as
only one service would ever use and procure such an item. The single service
procurement method involves the forwarding of requisitions (requirements) by one
service or components thereof to a designated procurement point in another
service. The requiring service cites the appropriate funds to support the
transaction. The designated procurement agency processes the order by making
contracts, or negotiating as the case may be, with commercial suppliers. The
procurement agency has no responsibility for checking the validity of or coor-
dinating requirements, but merely serves as central liaison and contact point
between the requiring agency and the supplier.
The extent of single service procurement is available in FT 19514-
statistics. Of $5«U billion made for procurement in J~> commodity classificaticnji
$1,9 billion represented purchases of one service for another. The effective-
ness of single service procurement as such is probably subject to a great deal
of debate, A House Subcommittee in hearings on expenditures in the executive
departments made the following recommendations in 1951:
• ••Greater use should be made of single-purchase assignment s,...There should
also be maximum effort in the form of joint and pooled operations with
respect to all aspects of supply management,
A somewhat contradictory recommendation is contained in a Study on Single
Service Procurement of Paint made by the Harvard Graduate School of Business,
which concluded in August 1951:
We believe that if assignment of responsibility for requirements and stock
control, as well as of procurement, to a single departeent does not prove
feasible or desireable...that the responsibility for procurement of paint

2h
should be returned to the individual services because:
(1) Our study lias indicated that no major benefits or significant
economies are inherent in single department procurement,
(2) Under individual service procurement it is easier to fix responsi-
bility for effective overall procurement and to git close working
relationships between personnel in the successive steps in the procure-
ment process. Such conditions appear to us to be essential for the
achievement cf the major savings stemming from good procurement planning
and prevention of overbuying. 2?
The 1$SS Hoover Cordission Reports contain the following ccmraent on the
basic limitations of coordinated procurement
»
Planning of requirements is not coordinated and the purchasing service is
not informed of the inventories and usage rates of the requiring service.
Thus the purchasing service cannot evaluate procurement requests or take
steps to redistribute excess stocks. Also, coordinated buying does not
achieve integration of storage and distribution, where glaring instances of
duplication have been noted.
It is considered of more than passing interest to examine briefly some df
the joint agencies set up to carry out the procurement assignment for a few of
the commodity areas covered by single procurement assignments. There have been
three such agencies set up to effect joint procurements The Armed Services
Petroleum Purchasing Agency (ASPPA), the Armed Services Medical-Dental Pur-
chasing Agency (ASMDPA), and the Armed Services Textile Procurement Agency
(ASTPA). A brief discussion of each of these agencies follow.
ASPPA
The ASPPA was originally set up by the Secretary of Defense under a
charter dated Ik February 19k&9 revised 7 October l$$$m The purpose cf the
agency was and is the achievement of optimum effectiveness and economy in all
aspects of the purchase and distribution of petroleum and related items for the
Armed Services and to provide information and data thereon to interested agen-
cies of the Department of Defense. The agency was set up as a joint agency of
c;?U.S., Congress, Federal Supply Management, Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Ccnnaittee on Expendilures in the Esecui Lve Dqpartaeattj house of




the three military departments. Policy guidance is furnished by the Secretary
of Defense. The agency is under the supervision and control of that military
department Secretary designated by the Secretary of Defense—-currently the
Secretary of the Mary. The actual operation of the agency is performed by an
agency staff, headed by a director, under the guidance and general supervision
of the directorate, consisting of three members: The Quartermaster General,
U# S # Armyj the Chief, BuSandA, U, S 9 Navyj and the Director, Supply and
Services, U. S # Air Force. The responsibilities of trie agency include: collate
total procurement requirements, implement detailed procurement operating instruc-
tions, purchase commercial petroleum services required, administer contracts,
coordinate item specification and standardization, provide guidance for inspec-
tion, coordinate tanker requirements, and coordinate cross-servicing agreements.
To indicate a specific area in which the Agency has prescribed economy
procedures, attention is invited to DOD Directive U15&.2 dated h November 195>lw
This directive assigned each military department responsibility for procurement
inspection and associated administrative functions for all petroleum products
within the geographical areas designated, thereby reducing duplicating overhead
facilities or services. It is believed that the agency lias made and continues
to make a significant contribution. The need for one DOD agency to coordinate
the total military requirements and the contracts therefor with the oil industry
is easy to comprehend. In searching the record, the writer was unable to locate
any negative evidence or criticism of the agency or its operations
.
ASMDPA
The Armed Services Medical Procurement Agency was originally authorized
by a SecDef Charter dated 29 June 19l;9, and was reconstituted by DOD Directive
5>l£lul0 dated 23 August 195U» The purpose of the Agency is to provide the most

effective and economical means of effecting coordinated procurement (including
promotion of the optimum degree of standardization) of medicines, and medical
items required by the Department of Defense for support of the armed forces.
The operation of the Agency is guided by a Directorate with a Chief of Agency
Staff designated by the Directorate responsible for the day-to-day operations
and administration of the Agency. The functions of the Agency are many and
detailed, and, in addition to central purchase and contract administration,
collating total requirements, implementing operating instructions, and routine
internal administration, include the following major areas of activity?
1. Arrange for the coordinated inspection and laboratory testing of
medical items.
2. Execute patent license agreements.
3. Formulate plans for industrial mobilization including facilities
allocation.
km Catalog medical items including the publication of standard catalog
prices.
£. Provide military specifications and standards for medical items.
6. Perform developmental engineering for medical items.
7. Prepare reports and recommendations required by each military depart-
ment and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Departmental functions, such as legal clearances, etc. required by statute for
a procurement agency as well as administrative support, are performed by the
Department of the Army by DOD designation. *°
So far as the writer was able to determine, the work of the ASMDPA has
been highly successful. This commodity area received easy coordination
emphasisj and in the areas of standardization, cataloging, and central procure-
ment, it is commonplace knowledge that rapid and effective progress was made.
However, the same situation has not prevailed with reference to other phases of
medical supply management. The Bonner Subcommittee Report of June 27, 19f?l,
commented adversely on the distribution phase of medical supply management and
^"Department of Defense, "Armed Services Medicine Procurement Agency,"
DOD Directive Number 51&.10 dated 23 June 195k, pp. U-5.
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the use of doctors, commissioned as medical officers, in supply administration.
The Subcommittee recommended and commented*
• ••pending the development of a fully integrated medical supply system for
the Department of Defense, all medical supply functions in the Department of
the Navy should be transferred to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and
that in the Army a similar transfer should be made to the Quartermaster Coips,
On November 22, 1950 the Secretary of Defense had already issued 13 policy
statements governing medical supply operations. Policy statement No. 11
directed the integration of the medical supply distribution system with the
departmental distribution system employed for all other material... 27
As a result of congressional criticism, a Medical Supply Support Test,
encompassing the supply areas of depot procurement, distribution, and depot
maintenance was initiated by DOD UlOO.5 of December 29, 195l» The setting of
this experiment was the Sixth Army Area, and involved central distribution,
and local procurement as necessary, of medical items used \3y all components of
the Armed Forces in the Pacific Area. The test became known as the "Alameda
Test, " and was disestablished by DOD Directive 5U-128 dated November 19, 195k»
The Navy regarded the test as "one step nearer a single supply service" and
strongly opposed it as a "backdoor route" to such a service. The hearings be-
fore a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Governmental Operations (the
Hhiehlman Subcommittee) 33d Congress contain the following coraaittee appraisal:
"Our study of the entire Alameda Test leads us to the conclusion that this uni-
formed operation has been abundantly successful, efficient, and economical."
The position of the Department of Defense is contained in the quoted testimony
(December 1952) of a departmental spokesman before a congressional subcommittee
:
In the opinion of the Department of Defense, the recent test conducted at
the Alameda nedical Center was a success and has demonstrated the feasi-
bility of assigning to a single military department the responsibility for
local procurement, distribution, and maintenance of medical supplies and
equipment in the 'West Coast Area. The test did not prove or disprove the
feasibility of a Nationwide single service distribution assignment.
*'U.S., Congress, Department of the Navy Appropriations for 1953,
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives, 3 2d Congress, Second Session (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1952), p. 36.
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The Alameda Test was a part of the over-all study of medical and dental
supply systems which is now under way and which is expected to be finalized
shortly. The final decision will be based on the findings with respect to
the Alameda Test and other important considerations.
The provisions with respect to the Secretary of Defense Directive of
July 17, 195>1, which provides in para, 5(c) thereof that priority study
shall be given to the feasibility of assigning to a single military de-
partment responsibility for procurement and distribution, including depot
storage and issue for classes, common items of supply and equipment and
depot maintenance of such equipment, as well as previous testimony given
on this subject by departmental representatives, are not believed to imply
anything more than that the feasibility of single service distribution will
be determined, while such a single service distribution assignment may turn
out to be ''feasible" no determination lias been made and, as indicated in my
testimony, it is quite possible that the decision will be adverse to such
an assignment,
A military supply system must be geared to meet wartime demands. Whether a
single service can adequately distribute medical supplies to all services
in wartime is probably the most critical question to be resolved. Whether
a single service distribution assignment will permit the most economical
use of trained personnel is another serious question. The final decision




The Armed Service Textile Procurement Agency (ASTPA) was established by
DOD Directive $l$k»k dated June 18, 1^52 as a joint purchasing agent under the
administrative control of the Army, The purpose of the agency generally con-
formed to that indicated in the earlier presentations on ASPPA and ASMDPA.
From the outset, the agency seemed to have been on the wrong side of fate, as
its activities were terminated 13 months after its establishment by direction of
a rider on the 195h DOD Appropriations Act, This was done because the Navy
maintained that participation in the Agency would double its a&dnistrative cost
for that particular procurement activity. The effectiveness of the Agency is
further indicated by a specific example, which was related to the writer by CDR.
J, C, Burrill, the Assistant Gfficer-in-charge, ^avy Purchasing Office, New




American countries was passed by NPO, New York to ASTPA, The routines followed
by the ASTPA including the passing of the requisition to the (JIG, U. S. Army
for clearance to purchase on the open market without formal advertising aid
contract took over 2j months* As the flags were required by the Navy for use in
urgent goodwill visits, Cdr, Eurrill finally succeeded in getting a go ahead
authority to effect local purchase by the Navy, which was consummated in two
weeks. The impression was gained in this conversation that the Army is a great
organization for recommending and obtaining for itself more than a proportionate
share of such coordinated ventures* However, the Navy is seldom allowed to
present criticisms of another service where the requirements of additional
staffing and red tape, frequently found in newly formed coordinating organiza-
tions, run counter to its more conservative experience—better and more economi-
cal results*
Long after the disestablishment of ASTPA, evidence of fraud and bribery
was discovered and aired by the Senate Committee on Government Operations!
In hearings recently held by the subcommittee more than mere waste and
inefficiency were developed. The subcommittee was confronted with graft and
corruption.,,.evidence. •showing that unscrupulous contractors had bribed
and connived with both civilian employees and armed services officers
attached to ASTPA to improperly favor contractors in the award and adminis-
tration of contracts. Evidence before the subcommittee clearly demonstrated
that inspection service personnel had likewise been corrupted to permit
thousands of defective caps to be delivered to Navy,..,*'
Interservice Supply Support
Interservice Supply Support involves action by one military service or
agency to provide supplies and related services to another military service or
agency, and concerns general areas not covered by single service or joint
*9u,S., Congress, 84th Congress, 2d Session, Textile Procurement in the
Services - Beport of the Committee on Government Operations, Senate Report
No. 13d0 Washington, Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 1, 2, 12.
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purchase assignments or single manager operations to be described later. Sur-
veys and feasibility tests with respect to joint utilization of facilities have
been carried on quite constantly since the 19hl Unification Act vrith few visible
results* Likewise efforts at supply cross-servicing at local levels have made
insignificant strides, except in some special commodity areas at overseas loca-
tions* Past performance has largely reflected a fragmentary approach, where at
best arrangements of expediency, dependent on cooperation among three independ-
ent suppl3r systems within specif"ic geographic areas, have prevailed*
On July 5, 1955* the Department of Defense issued Directive Ilumber
hlli0.6 on the subject of Interservice Supply Support to insure that "all laater-
ial is used to the maximum by the military services, thereby improving the
positioning of stocks, balancing inventories, and reducing Lack-hauling aid
cross-hauling of material within the military supply systems*" On 30 December
1955 the military heads of the military services promulgated a joint agreement
to provide uniform direction for coordinated action among the military services
in consonance with DOD Directive lj.liiO.6, referred to above* Up to this writing
there were no reports or statistics to indicate the degree of or success with
implementation of the program. CDR* Holt, a representative of the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense concerned with the program, indicated to the
writer that a great deal of enthusiasm has been generated, and that concrete and
economical results are expected. CDR* Holt further indicated that the Office
of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics) would ride herd on the




RECENT DEVELOPMENTS—INCLUDING THE SINGLE MANAGER PLAN
1955 Hoover Commission Report
The most recent external pressure put forth to achieve results in
integrating the Department of Defense Supply Systems, is found in the 1955
Hoover Commission Report. The task force report on food contains the following
comments
:
Our task force states that there is little more semblance of unification in
the supply of food and clothing than before the National Security Acts and
the O'Mahoney rider were passed, .
.
From the overall Department of Defense standpoint, overlapping, duplication,
and double handling is clearly evident. The task force found such situa-
tions as the Army renting commercial cold storage space in an area where
the Navy is not fully utilizing government-owned space.... The Navy has
large proportions of 1951 and earlier packs of subsistence items in their
system while other services are buying current packs of these items. It
was impossible to cross-service these items as the Navy had no centralized
knowledge of these inventories by pack....At the Navy Depot level, there
was a comingling of all packs and no observance of the rule, first-in,
first out. The fundamental weakness is traceable to the present organiza-
tion in which there is a complete absence of teamwork between purchasing
and stock management functions with the result that the right hand does not
know what the left hand is doing. • •
.
The purchase of canned tomatoes is one of the best examples of the need for
unified procurement. The task force pointed out that in 1951 the Army
shipped from California to New York 807,000 pounds of tomatoes, Durin^ the
same period the Navy shipped 775,000 pounds from the east coast to Califor-
nia.... The task force suggests that the Quartermaster General of the Army,
or a central food agency patterned after that organization, be assigned re-
sponsibility for performing all the major functions necessary not only for
the acquisition but also for the storage and distribution of food for the
armed services....-*
3°U.S., Congress, 8Uth Congress, Food and Clothing in the Government
,
House Document No. 1U6 containing reprint of 1955 Hoover Commission Re ort on




In approaching the subject of supply integration in the Depar-fenent of
Defense, the 1955 Hoover Commission considered coordinated procurement, cross-
servicing, and integrated supply systems—single manager assignment. Coor-
dinated procurement and cross-servicing were rejected because they were fragmen-
tary in nature and limited in their application to the whole problem of inte-
gration* The single department integrated system was believed the best of the
three, but had the following basic limitations
i
a, Resistance on the part of the military departments to collaborate,
b, Difficulty of assuring equitable treatment, particularly under
mobilization conditions,
c, Difficulty of eliminating duplicate staffs, facilities and distribution
systems.
d, Period of time required to develop and install uniform requisitioning,
purchasing, accounting, and inventory control procedures, a major
deterrent.
On the basis of the types of limitations indicated above, the Commission made
the following overall comments and recommendations
t
...The highest degree of integration would result from the creation of a
separate agency, within the framework of the Department of Def nse, to serve
all departments equally in purchasing, inventory control and distribution to
the end of the wholesale pipeline.
...Congress should enact legislation establishing a separate civilian
managed agency, reporting to the Secretary of Defense, to administer common
supply and service activities, ...A separate agency would be expected to
assume supply responsibilities only for commercial-type items and services..
It is recommended that the proposed agency be known as the Defense Supply
and Service Administration,...Its head should be known as the Adrainistrator,
and he should be a presidential appointee. The staff of the Administrator
should be composed of career trained support specialists, including a
principal career assistant..,. Initially, the agency should manage selected
items of common supply, and operate general and specialized hospitals,-^
To one intimately acquainted with the tremendous size of each of the
military services and with the advantages of a service-wide integrated supply
management system geared to the readiness of forces in being, the soundness of





the Hoover Commission recommendation for a separate civilian managed and manned
fourth service of supply is difficult to comprehend. The following factors
support the above opinion:
a. It would be necessary for each military department to continue to oper-
ate activities and maintain staffs fort collection and analysis of
usage data, translating equipment plans and schedules into projected
gross requirements for both "common" and "uncommon" supply items, con-
tinuing liaison among operating, engineering and supply personnel to
develop item requirements, developing projected expenditure budgets for
supply items, furnishing projected gross requirements to the central
agency, and manning and managing its retail supply distribution opera-
tions to serve the fleet and stations beyond the "wholesale" end of the
distribution line*
b. The translation of requirements to a central agency would increase
leadtimes significantly,
c. The individual Secretary would lose control over support functions
which are elements of readiness.
d. With respect to restricting military supply management personnel to
"tactical" activities, it is essential that there be full knowledge,
understanding, and appreciation of both the consumer problems and the
business problems at all echelons of the support system if that system
is to meet end requirements economic illy. The removal of aspiration to
high management positions would seriously discourage the attraction of
junior officers to man -the so-called "tactical" or "combat-related"
billets, in contrast to the- "career trained support gpecialists"
recommended for managing the wholesale distribution depots, etc. by the
Hoover Commission,
e. In emphasizing career civilians for operating management positions, the
report seems to confuse top policy civilian control of a military
service with the need for military managers at operating levels who




The separation of prime logistical functions—procurement and distri-
bution by a central service of supply, determination of requirements by
each military department—would divide responsibility for performance,
which is definitely not an accepted business principle. Under a divi-
sion of prime functions, there follows the need for numerous liaison
personnel and committees to provide the coordination previously pro-
vided by line authority within an organization.
iiecent Congressional Tones
In May 1955, a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions held hearings on the Food and Clothing Report made by the 1955 Hoover

Commission in -which various and sundry facets of the entire supply integration
movement were discussed and testimony received from representatives of the
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense and of the military departments. Much
of this testimony related to elements of minutia and to extreme examples, such
as the alleged 60-year supply of hamburgers in the Navy, which provided head-
lines for the consumption of congressional constituents. Much of the testimony
was relevant to the overall supply integration effort. Illustrative of the
straight forward approach used in the hearings is to be found in the comments
of Congressman Curtis
*
..•I have just one or two general questions to ask Mr. Pike (AsstSecDef ),
First of all it somewhat alarms me to hear you say that you are making
studies in regard to. ..the possibility of a common system of distribution
of these common-used items, food and subsistence...and I have in front of me
the hearings of our subcommittee back in June and July 195>2, and at that
tirde that was the answer given, that studies were to be made. ...We have
been over this thing backwards and forwards—that is the congressional
committees—and yet we always come up with the answer tliat nothing is being
done, but studies are being made—I am referring particularly to distribu-
tion...,Mr. Pike, perhaps I can best express it this way. If you agree, the
policy has been set by Congress, by law, the Military's decision is only one
of how to do it and not whether to do it. And yet so many of these studies
always come back to a question of whether you should be doing it.... 32
Mr. Pike's comments on the subject of integrated distribution follow:
As I say this whole subject, particularly when you get into the distribution
of it is a very complex one. I personally don't see my way clear yet as to
how to do this in all of the common-use items, I do see possibility for
substantial improvement in these other supply operations as they have men-
tioned that precede procurement, and I think may be the most important job
that we can do is to refine our requirements computations plus better inven-
tory control and management, because if you don't have sound inventory know-
ledge, it is a cinch that your procurement is going to be wrong. It is
going to be too much or too little. 33
The following quoted testimony relates to the relationship of an
AsstSecDef to a counterpart in the military services
t
3%,S., Congress, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives 81rth Congress (Washington:




Mr* Brownson* What are your relationships to the Assistant Secretaries
of the different services? Can you go to the Assistant Secretary for pro-
curement for the Navy and say, »$iy dear sir, you have hamburgers coming out
of your ears, please don't buy any more."
-* Pike. I don't have the authority to do that directly* However, if
a study of a single item like that was indicated, I have relationships with
that individual that would enable me in a friendly manner to suggest that
something should be done about it.
Mr* Brownson. If he didn't do anything, isn't there actually any action
you could take?
Mr, Pike, If it was important enough I would carry the matter to Mr,
Wilson and Fir, Wilson has all the authority that is necessary,
Mr* Brownson. That is the same question that I asked some 3 years ago
with the Bonner subcommittee and I got the same answer, that the whole
control is advisory.
What worries me is this. On the Hill we are inclined to debate defense
as if ^31 billion worth of defense bought you more defense than $J0 billion
worth, and as if that automatically bought you more than 429 billion worth.
But actually, we get to where actual authority is exercised by the Depart-
ment of Defense over the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy, we don't really
know whether the actual billion dollars vie appropriate will be spent for
hamburgers or special services equipment, or whether it is actually a con-
tribution to the muscles of the fighting forces.
Do you feel the Secretary of Defense has all the authority he needs to
enforce supply discipline over the three subordinate services?
Mr. Pike, In ray opinion there is no question about it.^4
In the same hearings, the statements of the Secretary of the ftavy
Thomas, a former AsstSecDef(S&L), seem to express a pertinent point of view of
a substantial member of the defense teams
I again want to say it (identification and cataloging) is far from com-
pleted but the program is there, it is being worked out, and we have good
people working very hard to accomplish it.
There is a great deal being done in cross-servicing,
Now, cross-servicing, in my opinion—and I give it to you as my opinion-
is the best way to operate these services because they are big, they have to
expand in war, and they have to be prepared to expand in war. If we can
have good individual services, well operated, well administered, good basic
programs, good standard catalogs, and then interchange with your surpluses
and shortages, and work together, you can do it, in ray opinion, at a mini-
mum expense, and you can be prepared for the expansion which we need in war.







The Single Kanager Commodity Assignment Plan
As indicated in the preceding chapters, one of the most complex pro-
blems that has faced the Department of Defense, since the Unification Act, has
been that of development of a suitable system for the management and distribu-
tion of common use items to the four military services* In developing a process
or system, the objective has been to reduce inventories and eliminate over-
lapping or duplication of functions within the Department of Defense supply
systems, and at the same time assure that military readiness and ability to ex-
pand in an emergency would not be jeopardized* This objective has apparently
been at the forefront, despite the "stop," "go slow," "turn around," and "speed
up" signs encountered enroute*
What has finally developed as the Department of Defense solution to the
problem is the Single Manager Commodity Assignment Plan, As the first step in
its implementation, DOD Directive No. 5160*11 dated k November 195$5 directs the
establishment of this principle to all food items in Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps depots in the United States, with the Secretary of the Army desig-
nated as the Single Manager*
What Is It?
The Single Manager Commodity Assignment Plan is a process whereby the
Secretary of one military department, designated by the Secretary of Defense, is
made responsible for the performance of all supply management functions related
to a specified commodity for all military services* This assignment encompasses
the entire supply field, from research and development through issue or disposal,
including cataloging, standardization, requirements determination, procurement,




How Does It Work?
The Secretary of a military department is selected to act as Single
Manager for a particular commodity. All of the other military services then
provide him with basic data for computation of requirements. Ownership of all
service wholesale depot stocks in the United States is then transferred to the
Single Manager. After developing all requirements and matching them against
what he now owns te meet total demand, the Single Manager then initiates pro-
curement for the net deficit. He will carry all stocks in a revolving fund,
and as the services require stock, they purchase from the Single Manager.
within a geographical area, the Single Manager selects the most desir-
ably located depot to support all services in the area. This selection may be
done without regard to the service which owns the depot. The chosen depot then
stores tiie depot stocks for the Single Manager, acting as his agent, and issues
asrequired to all services. It is possible for the Army to be the Single Mana-
ger for a commodity category and to have stocks in Army, Navy, Air Force and
Marine Corps depots. Only one depot will serve a given area, with the stocks
stored therein owned by the Single Manager.
The Single Manager will direct and coordinate all research and Develop-
ment, standardization and cataloging activities. He will be the only buyer of
depot stock items, and he will be the only seller. He will designate those item£
to be bought locally. Since he has knowledge of all assets, concurrent buying
and selling would be avoided, and he will be in a position to shift depot stocks
to meet varying area needs. In this manner the greatest possible use of stocks
is hoped for, and only that which is truly surplus will find its way to disposal,
since only the Single Manager can determine that it is no longer required.
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What Does It Do?
The Single Manager Plan purports to provide centralized control over
requirements and distribution, purchase, storage 3paee, inventory records, and
standardization. It further purports to elirainate duplicate pipelines, dupli-
cate depot storage facilities, and costly cross and back-hauling. Other objec-
tives are to make interservice supply automatic, provide for effective rotation
of mobilization reserves, and insure effective utilization of stocks, services
and facilities.
The evolution of the Single Manager system has been unduly slow but
progressive. It is the result of considerable study of several existing joint
service operations, incorporating the lessons learned therefrom. Joint service
operations, because of their very basic construction, permit no single ownership
of stocks, thereby necessitating the maintenance of costly equity accounts. The
joint agency is largely a service organization, able to provide for certain
functional tasks such as procurement and contract administration. The agency
can only perform at the call of the stock owner, and cannot provide single direc-
tion since there is no single head. This is not the case in the Single Manager
plan. There is only one wholesale stock, effectively positioned (not universally
accepted), centrally controlled, yet designed for the total DGD requirement,
with the Single Manager reporting only to the Secretary of Defense.
Illustrative Presentation of the Plan
Pictorial or chart sheets used in the Department of Defense to "sell"
the new system to top management are presented as Appendix I. They effectively
show Important facets of the present supply systems, and the future supply




It appears that in the Single **anager Plan, the Department of Defense
may have arrived at a workable, quasi integrated supply plan for common-use
items and services, which will satisfy many of the objections voiced by
congressional critics and the 193'5> Hoover Commission Heport. In the process,
however, it will have splintered the integrated supply systerns of at least one
or more of the services, which, for the most part, have 'oeen highly effective.
The Single Manager Plan will undoubtedly lead to application in areas other than
the common-use groups referred to in tiie Department of Defense Charts—and hence
will mean more intense supervision of the Secretaries of the military services




The subject developed in this paper has pointed up some definite obser-
vations of fact, opinion, and recommendation with respect to actions of Congress,
the Department of Defense, and the Hoover Commission designed to achieve inte-
gration in the supply and logistics field* The more important of these observa-
tions are:
(1) The magnitude and complexity of the Armed Services and the exper-
ience of World War II served to focus the attention of Congress, governmental
executives, and lay leaders upon possible savings in the field of coordinated
procurement, storage, and distribution,
(2) Although the 19hl Unification Act directed that appropriate steps
be taken to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of
procurement, supply, transportation, storage, etc*, it also specified that
coordination was to be achieved without merging the various services*
(3) The 19h9 Amendments to the Unification Act, while strengthening the
authority of the Secretary of Defense, omitted the original language referred
to in (2) above concerning the elimination of unnecessary duplication, etc*, and
reinforced the separate status of each military service.
(U) One of the more important areas which is a requisite far any worth-
while integration effort in the logistic field, uniform cataloging, floundered
for several years due to the original insistence of Congress that a civilian
agency be responsible for all gcwernmental cataloging, although the Defense




(5) As indicated by the hearings referred to in the discussion
chapters, a small group of congressmen early considered it a primary chore to
keep track (annually) of the integration efforts made in the logistic area in
DOD. Many times these small groups conducted their hearings and investigations
on assumptions that federal statutes specifically and unequivocally directed one
completely integrated supply system for the Department of Defense, When in fact
the statutes were discretionary.
(6) The efforts in DOD to achieve an integrated logistic system do not
seem to have been pursued consistently and uniformly, although a constant
objective has been to arrive at one best possible solution to a complex problem,
(7) The idea of a Single Manager Plan, recently announced as DOD policy,,
was included in a SecDef Memorandum for a feasibility study as far back as 19U9«
(8) Although the 0»Mahoney Amendment to the 1953 DOD Appropriations Act
(permanent legislation) did include some statutory teeth to require integration
of supply patterns among the various services, almost 3 years elapsed before the
Single Manager Plan became official DOD policy.
(9) It appears to this observer that the 1955 Hoover Oamtls 3ion Report,
in recommending a civilian managed Fourth Service of Supply:
(a) confused top policy civilian control with the need for military
managers at operating levels who possess qualifications in both
business administration and operational knowledge.
(b) was influenced directly or indirectly by the civil service
representation around and/or among its ranks.
(c) really built a fire under the DOD and forced the early announcef
ment of an integration program-—the Single Manager Plan.
(10) The Single Manager Plan may provide the basis for a quasi integrated
supply system which will satisfy certain elements of Congress and other critics.
It is doubtful, however, that substantial economies will result, particularly in
view of the fact that only the wholesale distribution system is affected, and as
each service will retain staffs for retail and organizational functions. Only
an unbiased evaluation of future operations will sustain or render invalid this

observation.
(11) The Single Jianager Flan is a much more acceptable alternative,
from a responsiveness and readiness viewpoint, than the Fourth Service of Supply
recommended by the 1955 Hoover Commission Report, How acceptable and workable
this plan would be under mobilization conditions is considered to be one of its
vulnerable aspects,
(12) The Single Manager Plan further extends the enveloping arms of the
Department of Defense's Assistant Secretaries ever the operations of the mili-
tary services,
(13) In view of the tremendous pressures from congressional and lay
critics, it is believed that the Department of Defense had little choice to do
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